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Abstract—Cloud computing enables businesses to use comput-
ing resources on-demand anywhere in the world without having
to build and maintain computing infrastructures in-house. This
model involves multiple parties performing diverse operations
via the Internet across multiple organisations. Employees and
consumers can access resources and services from their own and
associated organisations. Despite the success of cloud computing,
its security paradigm has one major challenge: how to determine
the identity and access rights of users across all the organisations.
The user’s credential and sensitive information are always stored
and maintained by the parent organisation, however, other
partner organisations require verification of the user’s identity
and access rights to allow them to access their services and
resources. The biggest difficulty is to communicate the user’s
identity to their partner organisations without sending their
sensitive information. Numerous open standard identity protocols
have been introduced in the last two decades. Amongst all, three
standard identity protocols Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML), Open Authentication (OAuth), and OpenID Connect
(OIDC) are the most established protocols in the cloud computing
industry. Therefore, this paper presents a working prototype and
critical analysis of these three open standard identity protocols
SAML, OAuth and OIDC. It also explores evaluation criteria
which are used for this analysis purpose. Finally, it discusses
their strengths and limitations, and determines the most suitable
open standard identity protocol for all types cloud computing
models.
Keywords—Cloud Computing Security, Open Standard Identity
Protocols, SAML, OAuth, OpenID Connect, SSO, IDaaS
I. INTRODUCTION
The connotation of cloud computing is “computing every-
where” that offers all the computing resources on-demand ev-
erywhere via Internet [1]. Cloud computing enables enterprises
and consumers to increase their productivity and efficiency of
their work by sharing resources and services anytime, any-
where. However, its success comes with a number of security
challenges [2], [3]. One of the major challenges is that how
to authenticate and authorize employees and consumers across
the business organisations. The parent organisation owns all
the credentials and sensitive information of users but partner
organisations require verification of users’ identities and access
rights for allowing them to access their services and resources.
The biggest problem to overcome is how to communicate
users’ identities to their partners without sending their sensitive
information. The solution to this problem is open standard
identity protocols, which are used to authenticate and authorize
users across all the business organisations [1], [2].
Open standard identity protocols have been developed to
support all authentication and authorization activities at a cor-
porate level. There are various open standard identity protocols
available, however, the most popular and successful protocols
are SAML, OAuth, and OIDC. SAML is an XML-based
protocol framework for communicating user authentication,
entitlement and attribute information [4]. OAuth is a scalable
delegation protocol that allows a user to grant access to an
application to perform authorized tasks on behalf of the user
[5]. OpenID Connect is a lightweight protocol that provides
a framework for communicating identity via RESTful APIs
[6]. These three protocols are used by the majority of cloud
computing organisations. Now, identity management services
became a stand-alone IT business called IDaaS (IDentity-as-
a-Service). Consequently, these open standard identity proto-
cols are crucial for authentication and authorization in cloud
computing security paradigm. Therefore, this paper presents
the working prototype and critical analysis of these three
open standard identity protocols SAML, OAuth and OIDC. In
addition, it explores evaluation criteria which are used for this
analysis purpose. Finally, it discusses their strengths and limi-
tations, and determines the most suitable open standard identity
protocol for all types cloud computing models. The remainder
of this paper is organised as follows: Section II elucidates
the working prototype of the three open standard identity
protocols SAML, OAuth and OIDC; Section III expounds
the comparative analysis of these three open standard identity
protocols; Section IV critically analyses and determines the
most suitable open standard identity protocol for all types of
cloud computing; Section V concludes the paper and suggests
some future areas of extension.
II. WORKING PROTOTYPE OF OPEN STANDARD IDENTITY
PROTOCOLS: SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
A. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
SAML is an XML-based protocol framework for commu-
nicating user authentication, entitlement and attribute informa-
tion [4]. It allows the two federation partners to choose and
share desirable identity attributes in a SAML assertion (mes-
sage) payload as long as those attributes can be represented in
XML [6]. SAML presumes three main roles in any transaction:
Identity Provider (IDP), Service Provider (SP) and User. A
working prototype of SAML is illustrated in Fig. 1. The SAML
assertion (security token) is the core concept in SAML. The
SAML assertion is a claim, statement, or declaration of an
identity that consists of the IDP and trusted by the SP. The
IDP and SP normally agree up front what information the
SP requires. However, there is a mechanism to renegotiate
Fig. 1. A working prototype of SAML
Fig. 2. A working prototype of OAuth
additional information.
B. Open Authorization (OAuth)
OAuth is a scalable delegation protocol that allows a user
to grant access to an application for performing authorized
tasks on behalf of the user [5]. Thus, it enables a third-
party application to obtain limited access to a HTTP service.
This secure API authorization can be performed from desktop,
web and mobile applications. It introduces the concept of an
authorization token that states the right of the client application
to access authorized services on the server. However, it does
not supersede any access control decisions that the server-side
application might make. The OAuth 2.0 core authorization
framework is described by IETF in RFC-6749 alongside with
several other specifications and profiles [7]. OAuth presumes
four main roles in any authorization process Resource Server
(RS), Resource Owner (RO)/User, OAuth Consumer/Client
(OC) and Authorization Server (AS) [8]. A working prototype
of OAuth is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3. A working prototype of OIDC
C. OpenID Connect (OIDC)
OIDC is a lightweight protocol that provide a framework
for communicating identity via RESTful APIs [6]. OpenID
Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on the top of the OAuth
2.0 protocol [6], [9]. It enables clients to verify the identity
of the end user based on the authentication performed by
an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile
information about the end user. OpenID Connect facilitates
two primary types of tokens: an Access Token and an ID
Token. The ID token is a JWT (JSON Web Token) and
contains information about the authenticated user. It is signed
by the identity provider and can be read and verified without
accessing the identity provider [10]. OIDC presumes five main
roles in any authentication and authorization process End User
(EU), Relying Party (RP), Authorization Endpoint (AE), Token
Endpoint (TE) and UserInfo Endpoint (UIE) [10]. A working
prototype of OIDC is illustrated in Fig. 3.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPEN STANDARD
IDENTITY PROTOCOLS: SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
Table I expounds the comparative analysis of these three
open standard identity protocols SAML, OAuth and OIDC on
the basis of several explored criteria.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF OPEN STANDARD IDENTITY
PROTOCOLS: SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
The comparative analysis has demonstrated the charac-
teristics, strengths and limitations of SAML, OAuth and
ODIC standards. Both SAML and OIDC support a one-
time, certificate-based, risk-based, multi-factor, and multi-level
authentication and authorization. However, OAuth has been
designed for a specific purpose of authorization, consequently,
it cannot be the complete solution for any cloud computing
model. SAML is an XML-based protocol standard, where
XML trees are represented in a verbose form. Every element
in the tree has a name (i.e., the element type name), and the
element must be enclosed in a matching pair of tags. Whereas,
OIDC is a JSON-based protocol standard, and JSON trees are
represented in a nested array type of notation similar to that
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF OPEN STANDARD IDENTITY PROTOCOLS: SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
Criteria SAML OAuth OIDC
1. Authentication It is a standard for authentication.
It is not a standard for
authentication, however, it can
accomplish indirect authentication.
It is a standard for authentication.
2. Authorization It is a standard for authorization. It is a standard for authorization(delegation) of resources. It is a standard for authorization.
3. Prime Objective
Federated Identity Management
(FIM), Single Sign-On (SSO) for
enterprise users.
API authorization between
Applications.
Federated Identity Management
(FIM), Single Sign-On (SSO) for
consumers.
4. Token Format XML XML, JSON, JWT JSON, JWT
5. Token Content Token contains user identityinformation but not credentials.
Token contains user identity
information but not credentials.
Token contains user identity
information but not credentials.
6. Protocol Used XML, HTTP, SOAP JSON, HTTP, REST JSON, HTTP, REST
7. Schemas and
Deployments SPML, SCIM SCIM SCIM
8. Roles/Actors Identity Provider (IDP), ServiceProvider (SP) and User.
Resource Server (RS), Resource
Owner (RO)/User, OAuth
Consumer/Client (OC) and
Authorization Server (AS).
End User (EU), Relying Party
(RP), Authorization Endpoint
(AE), Token Endpoint (TE) and
UserInfo Endpoint (UIE).
9. Transaction
Initiation SP and IDP initiation. Consumer/Client (OC) initiation.
Relying Party (RP)/ End User
initiation.
10. User Consent
It is not responsible for collecting
users consent. However, ECP
allows for the exchange of SAML
attributes outside the context of a
web browser.
It collects users consent before
sharing attributes.
It collects users consent before
sharing attributes.
11. Claims No distributed and aggregatedclaims.
No distributed and aggregated
claims. Distributed and aggregated claims.
12. Client
Discovery and
On-Boarding
No dynamic introductions. No dynamic introductions. Dynamic introductions.
13. Immediate
Revocation of
Access
It supports revocation. However, in
some cases, removal of the user
from the identity provider, means
that manual suspension must also
be performed. Otherwise,
authentication will continue using
access tokens and SSH keys.
It supports revocation. Token
revocation is used to revoke a
specified OAuth 2.0 access or
refresh token. A revoke token
request causes the removal of the
client permissions associated with
the specified token used to access
the user’s protected resources.
It supports revocation. Similar to
OAuth. However, OIDC has
additional ID token that is a
cryptographically signed,
self-contained token. It allows
resource owners to authorize
access without a call to the
authorization server and it cannot
be explicitly revoked.
14. Integrity/
Non-repudiation
XML Signature - X.509; SAML
tokens are almost always signed
with a private key, as it is a trusted
relationship between IDP and SP.
Default bearer token has no proof
of possession. However, token
contents can be protected by using
a DS or a MAC.
JSON Web Signature (JWS)-
HMAC SHA-256; [Additional
Support -RSA SHA-256 and
ECDSA P-256 SHA-256].
15. Confidentiality/
Privacy
XML Encryption-
Triple-DES-CBC with 192-bit key
and a 64-bit initialization Vector
(IV), AES-CBC with a 128-bit
initialization vector (IV);
[TLS-SSL, Web Services Security
(WSS)].
TLS is mandatory to implement
with OAuth for token
confidentiality. However, token
encryption must be applied in
addition to the usage of TLS
protection.
JSON Web Encryption (JWE)-
RSA-PKCS1-1.5 with 2048-bit
key, AES-128-CBC, and
AES-256-CBC; [Additional
Support- ECDH-ES with 256-bit
key, AES-128-GCM, and
AES-256-GCM].
of Javascript. Consequently, JSON is less verbose than XML,
when it is encoded its size is also smaller. This makes OIDC
more compact than SAML and a good choice to be passed in
HTML and HTTP environments [11]. Both SAML and OIDC
support a SSO functionality however, OIDC also provides a
user-friendly sign-on approach for mobile and small device
based cloud computing. Mobile application development has
fewer compatibility issues with OIDC than SAML assertions,
and its use is common in mobile apps [11]. OIDC standard
works well with both Web browsers and WebViews or native
mobile apps. SAML is specially designed for Web browsers.
SAML is limited in its ability to support mobile and small
devices because of its conceived structure. Perhaps, this may be
due to its development time around 2005, when even the first
iPhone was not launched. Whereas, OIDC has been designed
from the inception to provide services for the web, mobile
devices and Internet of Things. It has also been working
towards standardising a dedicated version for mobile device
called GSMA Mobile Connect standard.
SAML mainly supports the cloud enterprise model (i.e.,
enterprise-to-enterprise) because its architectural design re-
quires service provider (SP) enterprise and identity provider
(IDP) enterprise, and a trusted relationship between them.
Whereas, OIDC supports all cloud business models, and which
is suitable for both enterprises and consumers. It is the most
popular cloud model among consumers and for the untrusted
third party association. Communication security is another
important parameter in case of open and insecure wireless
channels, which is prone to many eavesdropping attacks [12].
The security tokens transported over wireless channels should
not be tampered with or altered over its entire life cycle; and its
sensitive information should be protected from the disclosure
to unauthorized parties. This requires strong digital signature
or MAC, and encryption techniques to ensure the integrity
and confidentiality of security tokens and its information.
Both SAML and OIDC have almost similar security supports.
However, signing XML with XML Digital Signature without
introducing obscure security holes is very difficult compared
to the simplicity of signing JSON [13]. Additionally, JWT
does not use sessions; therefore, it is free from Cross-Site
Request Forgery (CSRF) and many other attacks and offers
greater security over SAML token for cloud communications
[11].
It has been derived from the comparative analysis and
exhibited above that SAML has some issues and requires
upgrading to make it suitable for mobile and small resource
constrained devices/networks. OAuth is the best fit for the
purpose for what it has been developed. However, it is only
a delegation protocol, therefore, it has not been developed for
full authentication and authorization and cannot be a complete
security standard. OAuth is a complementary protocol for both
SAML and OIDC. OAuth is already an integral part of OIDC
standard, whereas, it can also be embedded into SAML to
make SAML more suitable and lightweight for mobile and
small device based cloud computing. OpenID Connect would
be the best choice for all kinds of cloud computing models
as it fulfils most of the requirements for lightweight and
secure cloud communications. However, it is an emerging
standard, and the final OpenID Connect 1.0 specifications
were launched on February 26, 2014 [9]. Furthermore, several
leading organisation such as Facebook and Twitter have their
own version of OpenID Connect, which are called Facebook
and Twitter Connect based on OAuth 2.0. Therefore, OIDC
requires more time and enterprise acceptance to become a
mature standard for cloud computing.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a working prototype and critical
analysis of open standard identity protocols SAML, OAuth
and OIDC in a cloud computing security paradigm. This
critical analysis was based on the evaluation criteria which
are explored for this analysis purpose. Subsequently, it has
discussed their strengths and weaknesses and determined the
most suitable open standard identity protocol for all types
cloud computing models. SAML was developed before smart
mobile phones and small devices were introduced, and there-
fore it has many legacy features, which are not compatible with
mobile and small devices based cloud computing and would
requires upgrading to make it suitable. OAuth is the best fit
for the purpose for what it has been developed but not as a
complete identity protocol suite. OpenID Connect would be
the best choice for all types of cloud computing as it fulfils
most of the requirements for it. However, it requires more time
and enterprise acceptance to become a mature cloud computing
standard identity protocol. In the future, it may be interesting to
perform practical investigations on SAML, OAuth and OIDC
for various cloud computing models.
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